LA Times Story by Julian E. Barnes, Laura King and Alex Rodriguez. Rodriguez reported from Islamabad and King reported from Kabul. Times staff writer Julian E. Barnes in Washington contributed to this report.
Excerpt--
Experts say both Pakistan and Afghanistan realize that breaking the Haqqani network's ties with Al Qaeda is a prerequisite to any deal. They question whether it would ever happen.
Amir Rana, one of Pakistan's leading analysts on militant groups, said it's not possible for many militant groups, including the Haqqani network, to completely separate from Al Qaeda.
"What the Haqqani network and the other Taliban groups can offer is a guarantee that they will influence Al Qaeda to not attack U.S. or NATO forces, and a guarantee that their soil would not be used in a terrorist attack against the West," he said. "This is the maximum concession that the Taliban can offer."
Numbering in the thousands of fighters, the Haqqani network has a strong relationship with Pakistan's military and intelligence community that stretches 30 years, back to the time when Pashtun warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani organized mujahedin fighters against Soviet troops in the 1980s. Haqqani has now delegated authority over his network of fighters to his son, Sirajuddin.
The group moves freely between Afghanistan's eastern provinces and its headquarters in North Waziristan, where it has been left untouched by Pakistan's military. Experts believe the Haqqani network continues to provide Al Qaeda leaders and commanders sanctuary there.
U.S. leaders have frequently urged Pakistan to launch an offensive against Haqqani hideouts, recently backing those entreaties with evidence that the network was behind major attacks in Kabul and at Bagram air base, the U.S. facility north of the capital. The government in Islamabad, meanwhile, has brushed aside those demands, arguing that its forces are overstretched by extensive military operations against Taliban strongholds in surrounding tribal areas.
Analysts and former Pakistani military commanders, however, say the real reason that Islamabad has avoided military action against the Haqqani network is that it sees the group and other Afghan Taliban elements as a useful hedge against India's rapidly growing interests in Afghanistan.
Haqqani leaders have yet to signal whether they are interested in starting talks with Karzai's government.
Ordinary rendition of relevant information being held in secret captivity out of the reach of the eroding attention span.
Warfare continues to become more professional and dehumanized every day.
The purpose of Extraordinary Edition is being revisited for winter, headed into 2013. U.S. foreign policy, Central Asia and the Middle East remain key focal points. Economics and culture on your front doorstep are coming into focus here.
Showing posts with label Hamid Karzai. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hamid Karzai. Show all posts
Wednesday, June 30, 2010
Wednesday, June 16, 2010
It's not news; it's just astounding: How U.S. Funds Taliban
"US military officials in Kabul estimate that a minimum of 10 percent of the Pentagon's logistics contracts--hundreds of millions of dollars--consists of payments to insurgents."
—Aram Roston, The Nation magazine
This information is from November 9, 2009. I just don't understand why it's outside public consciousness that the United States has been paying its enemy to fight our own people in uniform for years while the popular support of the U.S. war in Afghanistan hangs by a tiny thread of the last half-successful hunt for a terrorist or "high-value target." If citizens of the U.S. were told by CNN, Fox, MSNBC and the rest that the Taliban in Afghanistan was being paid by the U.S. to not attack supply convoys, how would there be support for the war? It's like betting against the champ in a boxing match when you've already heard the champ is going to throw the fight. Which, when all of your social programs have been shut down, unemployment is in double-digits, consumer lending has stalled and twenty percent of homes are worth less than the amount owed to the bank, Afghanistan (not even getting into Iraq and saber-rattling plans to invade Iran) seems like a summer vacation that should have been canceled because this year, kids, we just can't afford it.
If you follow the link, you'll see the entire (old) story at thenation.com
—Aram Roston, The Nation magazine
This information is from November 9, 2009. I just don't understand why it's outside public consciousness that the United States has been paying its enemy to fight our own people in uniform for years while the popular support of the U.S. war in Afghanistan hangs by a tiny thread of the last half-successful hunt for a terrorist or "high-value target." If citizens of the U.S. were told by CNN, Fox, MSNBC and the rest that the Taliban in Afghanistan was being paid by the U.S. to not attack supply convoys, how would there be support for the war? It's like betting against the champ in a boxing match when you've already heard the champ is going to throw the fight. Which, when all of your social programs have been shut down, unemployment is in double-digits, consumer lending has stalled and twenty percent of homes are worth less than the amount owed to the bank, Afghanistan (not even getting into Iraq and saber-rattling plans to invade Iran) seems like a summer vacation that should have been canceled because this year, kids, we just can't afford it.
If you follow the link, you'll see the entire (old) story at thenation.com
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
Campaign to push Taliban out of Kandahar has 7 months to succeed
May 11 article in The Australian comes via Afghan Conflict Monitor ...
THE campaign to drive the Taliban out of Kandahar province has until the end of the year to succeed if it is to capitalise on maximum troop numbers and political unity, Nato commanders and Western diplomats told The Times.
"Our mission is to show irreversible momentum by the end of 2010 - that's the clock I'm using," Brigadier-General Frederick Hodges, the US Director of Operations in southern Afghanistan, said. "We'll never have more capacity than we have by late summer 2010. We'll never have it any better."
The joint Nato-Afghan campaign - codenamed Hamkari, which is the Dari word for co-operation - will use the biggest number of troops and police in the country yet. Thousands of Afghan National Army soldiers and paramilitaries are to combine with the existing coalition force in Kandahar as well as additional units from among the 13,000 troops being sent in the second phase of the US surge.
The military strategy involves combining regular US soldiers and special forces with Afghan police and paramilitaries to establish 32 posts around Kandahar city at every access point along the key route through the province. Afghan army units and coalition troops will then attempt to clear the Taliban from the outlying districts of Arghandab, Zhari and Panjwayi.
President Karzai and Western commanders have avoided calling Hamkari an operation and have emphasised its political and administrative focus. Kandahar is the Taliban's traditional heartland and its population has become disaffected with the nepotism, ineptitude and corruption that have characterised the local government.
"I'm not going to talk about a D-day or an H-hour or even, for that matter, military operations," said Major-General Nick Carter, the British officer commanding coalition forces in the south. "This is much more about getting the population to feel secure in the hands of its own government and its own security forces so that it then begins to work... as an informing population, so that it denies the insurgent the freedom of movement to come in and intimidate and mount `spectaculars'."
The first phase of Hamkari began a fortnight ago and the strategy will include measures such as registering weapons, vehicles, hotels, madrassas and seminaries. Western officials are keen to have a broader range of village and tribal representation in the shuras, or councils, which communicate with officials. They are also keen to bolster the authority of Tooryalai Wesa, the Governor, at the expense of the city's current strongman, Ahmad Wali Karzai, the half-brother of the President.
Nato commanders estimate that up to 75 per cent of Taliban fighters in Kandahar province, most of whom are concentrated in the three districts targeted by the military campaign, are locals who may reintegrate if they are offered the right incentives. The commanders are also encouraged by the absence of foreign fighters. "We've seen no hardcore al-Qa'ida links here," a senior Nato intelligence officer told The Times. "Zero al-Qa'ida."
Yet Nato officers know that they have a tough deadline. By the end of the year troop numbers will decline and Dutch forces will withdraw. In November political attention in Washington will be focused on the midterm elections and critics of the war will remind President Obama of his pledge to start pulling out combat troops in 2011.
"If there's a change in the game and it looks like we can run the table then Obama will gain some political oxygen," noted a senior Western diplomat involved closely with the Hamkari campaign. "But if we can't deliver by Christmas... people at home will remind the President of the deal (to begin the withdrawal of US combat troops in 2011)."
Apart from the need for evidence of success, Nato planners have several other concerns. Officers note that it took the Afghan Government too long to put ministry level representatives in two districts of Helmand that were cleared of the Taliban during Operation Moshtarak this year, and question how it will fare in Kandahar, which is four times the size.
Although the Western officials are keen for the Taliban fighters to reintegrate, as yet there is no plan from the Government to encourage this. "There has to be a carrot at the end of the stick if these fighters are to reintegrate," one officer said, "but as yet we don't see one from Kabul."
THE campaign to drive the Taliban out of Kandahar province has until the end of the year to succeed if it is to capitalise on maximum troop numbers and political unity, Nato commanders and Western diplomats told The Times.
"Our mission is to show irreversible momentum by the end of 2010 - that's the clock I'm using," Brigadier-General Frederick Hodges, the US Director of Operations in southern Afghanistan, said. "We'll never have more capacity than we have by late summer 2010. We'll never have it any better."
The joint Nato-Afghan campaign - codenamed Hamkari, which is the Dari word for co-operation - will use the biggest number of troops and police in the country yet. Thousands of Afghan National Army soldiers and paramilitaries are to combine with the existing coalition force in Kandahar as well as additional units from among the 13,000 troops being sent in the second phase of the US surge.
The military strategy involves combining regular US soldiers and special forces with Afghan police and paramilitaries to establish 32 posts around Kandahar city at every access point along the key route through the province. Afghan army units and coalition troops will then attempt to clear the Taliban from the outlying districts of Arghandab, Zhari and Panjwayi.
President Karzai and Western commanders have avoided calling Hamkari an operation and have emphasised its political and administrative focus. Kandahar is the Taliban's traditional heartland and its population has become disaffected with the nepotism, ineptitude and corruption that have characterised the local government.
"I'm not going to talk about a D-day or an H-hour or even, for that matter, military operations," said Major-General Nick Carter, the British officer commanding coalition forces in the south. "This is much more about getting the population to feel secure in the hands of its own government and its own security forces so that it then begins to work... as an informing population, so that it denies the insurgent the freedom of movement to come in and intimidate and mount `spectaculars'."
The first phase of Hamkari began a fortnight ago and the strategy will include measures such as registering weapons, vehicles, hotels, madrassas and seminaries. Western officials are keen to have a broader range of village and tribal representation in the shuras, or councils, which communicate with officials. They are also keen to bolster the authority of Tooryalai Wesa, the Governor, at the expense of the city's current strongman, Ahmad Wali Karzai, the half-brother of the President.
Nato commanders estimate that up to 75 per cent of Taliban fighters in Kandahar province, most of whom are concentrated in the three districts targeted by the military campaign, are locals who may reintegrate if they are offered the right incentives. The commanders are also encouraged by the absence of foreign fighters. "We've seen no hardcore al-Qa'ida links here," a senior Nato intelligence officer told The Times. "Zero al-Qa'ida."
Yet Nato officers know that they have a tough deadline. By the end of the year troop numbers will decline and Dutch forces will withdraw. In November political attention in Washington will be focused on the midterm elections and critics of the war will remind President Obama of his pledge to start pulling out combat troops in 2011.
"If there's a change in the game and it looks like we can run the table then Obama will gain some political oxygen," noted a senior Western diplomat involved closely with the Hamkari campaign. "But if we can't deliver by Christmas... people at home will remind the President of the deal (to begin the withdrawal of US combat troops in 2011)."
Apart from the need for evidence of success, Nato planners have several other concerns. Officers note that it took the Afghan Government too long to put ministry level representatives in two districts of Helmand that were cleared of the Taliban during Operation Moshtarak this year, and question how it will fare in Kandahar, which is four times the size.
Although the Western officials are keen for the Taliban fighters to reintegrate, as yet there is no plan from the Government to encourage this. "There has to be a carrot at the end of the stick if these fighters are to reintegrate," one officer said, "but as yet we don't see one from Kabul."
Tuesday, May 11, 2010
Poll shows Afghanistan not worth it; Obama handling it well, though
This poll makes people seem dumb. Or maybe just polls. Or like polls show that people aren't paying attention ... when polled. Or when reading the news.
Let's just say there is a problem in the way you are asking the questions if more than half of your respondents say they're against the endeavor in question, then immediately following that answer, over half of them contend they approve of the way the same endeavor is being handled. Puzzling, troublesome.
Washington Post-ABC News poll featured on Huffington Post May 11
On Afghanistan, a negative shift
Afghan president Hamid Karzai's visit to the White House this week arrives as the public's take on the war there has tilted back to negative, according to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll.
A majority says the war in Afghanistan is not worth its costs, marking a return to negative territory after a brief uptick in public support in the wake of the announcement of the administration's new strategy for the conflict.
Despite the shift in views on the war, President Obama's ratings for handling the conflict have remained positive since the unveiling of the new strategy - 56 percent approve, 36 percent disapprove.
Views on the war's value have become more negative among both Democrats and independents. In the new poll, 56 percent of independents say it is not worth fighting, up from 47 percent in December. Among Democrats, 66 percent say it's not worth it, including half who feel that way strongly.
Republicans are solidly behind the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, with 69 percent saying the war is worth its costs.
Q. All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war in Afghanistan has been worth fighting, or not? Do you feel that way strongly or somewhat?
-- Worth it -- -Not worth it-
NET Strongly NET Strongly
4/25/10 45 26 52 38
12/13/09 52 33 44 35
11/15/09 44 30 52 38
10/18/09* 47 28 49 36
9/12/09 46 28 51 37
8/17/09 47 31 51 41
7/18/09 51 34 45 34
3/29/09 56 37 41 28
2/22/09 50 34 47 37
12/14/08 55 NA 39 NA
7/13/08 51 NA 45 NA
2/25/07 56 NA 41 NA
*10/18/09 "was" and "has been" wording half sampled. Previous "was".
By Jennifer Agiesta | May 9, 2010; 4:56 PM ET
Huffington Post story follows ...
Majority of Americans think Afghanistan "not worth it." According to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll, only 44% of Americans believe the Afghan war is worth its costs, while 52% disagree. This ends a brief jump in popular support for the war that occurred after President Obama announced his new surge strategy.
Support for the war is weakest among Democrats, two-thirds of whom agree the Afghan war is not worth it. A majority of Independents (56%) also feel the war isn't worth fighting. On the other hand, 69% of Republicans surveyed believe the war is worth its costs.
Though Americans seem to be losing confidence in the Afghan war, the poll finds they still approve of Obama's handling of the war by a 20-point margin: 56% approve, while 36% disapprove.
Treat Karzai with more respect, Obama tells officials. In advance of a four-day summit with the Afghan president, Obama has warned his senior staff to stop criticizing the Afghan government, the Washington Post and the Telegraph report.
This follows several months of press leaks and public criticism of Karzai, his family, and top officials for corruption, incompetence, and alleged ties to Afghanistan's opium industry. Karzai retaliated for the diplomatic slights by musing about joining the Taliban during a meeting with Afghan elders.
The Obama administration's divisions over Karzai are well-known. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is regarded as Karzai's "best friend" in Washington, while Vice President Joe Biden and National Security Advisor James L. Jones are known to be among his harshest critics.
The divide extends to Kabul: Gen. Stanley McChrystal has repeatedly urged Obama to identify more closely with Karzai, while Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke have urged him to distance himself from the Afghan president.
But in recent days, most senior U.S. officials have publicly expressed their support for Karzai. This helps Obama achieve the goal he has set for the Karzai summit: to reassure the Afghan President that the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan, and to its president, will extend beyond the withdrawal of U.S troops to the country, set to begin in June 2011.
Pressure mounts on Pakistan to take on North Waziristan militants. The revelation that the Pakistan Taliban are linked to the Times Square bomb plot has contributed to a major reversal in the Pakistan-U.S. relationship, Reuters and the New York Times report.
The U.S. has long lobbied Pakistan to take action in North Waziristan, but pressure has become more direct in the past few days. This past week, U.S. Ambassador Anne Patterson relayed a "forceful" message to Pakistan president Asif Ali Zardari, urging him to take action. The top U.S. general in Afghanistan, Stanley McChrystal met with the Pakistani military chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, to relay a similar message.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, meanwhile, warned in an interview with CBS that there would be "severe consequences" if the Times Square plot were linked to the Pakistani Taliban.
Pakistani officials have been quick to argue their troops are overstretched after mounting operations in South Waziristan and the Swat valley. But Ahmed Rashid, in a column for the BBC, warns that Pakistan's strategy of leaving North Waziristan alone is not working, noting that "thousands of fighters and their commanders [from Swat and South Waziristan] have regrouped" in there, and have since rolled back much of the progress Pakistan claimed to make elsewhere in the northwest of the country.
Let's just say there is a problem in the way you are asking the questions if more than half of your respondents say they're against the endeavor in question, then immediately following that answer, over half of them contend they approve of the way the same endeavor is being handled. Puzzling, troublesome.
Washington Post-ABC News poll featured on Huffington Post May 11
On Afghanistan, a negative shift
Afghan president Hamid Karzai's visit to the White House this week arrives as the public's take on the war there has tilted back to negative, according to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll.
A majority says the war in Afghanistan is not worth its costs, marking a return to negative territory after a brief uptick in public support in the wake of the announcement of the administration's new strategy for the conflict.
Despite the shift in views on the war, President Obama's ratings for handling the conflict have remained positive since the unveiling of the new strategy - 56 percent approve, 36 percent disapprove.
Views on the war's value have become more negative among both Democrats and independents. In the new poll, 56 percent of independents say it is not worth fighting, up from 47 percent in December. Among Democrats, 66 percent say it's not worth it, including half who feel that way strongly.
Republicans are solidly behind the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, with 69 percent saying the war is worth its costs.
Q. All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war in Afghanistan has been worth fighting, or not? Do you feel that way strongly or somewhat?
-- Worth it -- -Not worth it-
NET Strongly NET Strongly
4/25/10 45 26 52 38
12/13/09 52 33 44 35
11/15/09 44 30 52 38
10/18/09* 47 28 49 36
9/12/09 46 28 51 37
8/17/09 47 31 51 41
7/18/09 51 34 45 34
3/29/09 56 37 41 28
2/22/09 50 34 47 37
12/14/08 55 NA 39 NA
7/13/08 51 NA 45 NA
2/25/07 56 NA 41 NA
*10/18/09 "was" and "has been" wording half sampled. Previous "was".
By Jennifer Agiesta | May 9, 2010; 4:56 PM ET
Huffington Post story follows ...
Majority of Americans think Afghanistan "not worth it." According to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll, only 44% of Americans believe the Afghan war is worth its costs, while 52% disagree. This ends a brief jump in popular support for the war that occurred after President Obama announced his new surge strategy.
Support for the war is weakest among Democrats, two-thirds of whom agree the Afghan war is not worth it. A majority of Independents (56%) also feel the war isn't worth fighting. On the other hand, 69% of Republicans surveyed believe the war is worth its costs.
Though Americans seem to be losing confidence in the Afghan war, the poll finds they still approve of Obama's handling of the war by a 20-point margin: 56% approve, while 36% disapprove.
Treat Karzai with more respect, Obama tells officials. In advance of a four-day summit with the Afghan president, Obama has warned his senior staff to stop criticizing the Afghan government, the Washington Post and the Telegraph report.
This follows several months of press leaks and public criticism of Karzai, his family, and top officials for corruption, incompetence, and alleged ties to Afghanistan's opium industry. Karzai retaliated for the diplomatic slights by musing about joining the Taliban during a meeting with Afghan elders.
The Obama administration's divisions over Karzai are well-known. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is regarded as Karzai's "best friend" in Washington, while Vice President Joe Biden and National Security Advisor James L. Jones are known to be among his harshest critics.
The divide extends to Kabul: Gen. Stanley McChrystal has repeatedly urged Obama to identify more closely with Karzai, while Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke have urged him to distance himself from the Afghan president.
But in recent days, most senior U.S. officials have publicly expressed their support for Karzai. This helps Obama achieve the goal he has set for the Karzai summit: to reassure the Afghan President that the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan, and to its president, will extend beyond the withdrawal of U.S troops to the country, set to begin in June 2011.
Pressure mounts on Pakistan to take on North Waziristan militants. The revelation that the Pakistan Taliban are linked to the Times Square bomb plot has contributed to a major reversal in the Pakistan-U.S. relationship, Reuters and the New York Times report.
The U.S. has long lobbied Pakistan to take action in North Waziristan, but pressure has become more direct in the past few days. This past week, U.S. Ambassador Anne Patterson relayed a "forceful" message to Pakistan president Asif Ali Zardari, urging him to take action. The top U.S. general in Afghanistan, Stanley McChrystal met with the Pakistani military chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, to relay a similar message.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, meanwhile, warned in an interview with CBS that there would be "severe consequences" if the Times Square plot were linked to the Pakistani Taliban.
Pakistani officials have been quick to argue their troops are overstretched after mounting operations in South Waziristan and the Swat valley. But Ahmed Rashid, in a column for the BBC, warns that Pakistan's strategy of leaving North Waziristan alone is not working, noting that "thousands of fighters and their commanders [from Swat and South Waziristan] have regrouped" in there, and have since rolled back much of the progress Pakistan claimed to make elsewhere in the northwest of the country.
Karzai visit: beneath the veneer of glad-handing
"Afghanistan's Karzai arrives in Washington for visit intended to ease tensions"
A Washington Post story delves into some of the rifts in the high ranks of the military over strategies and policies in Afghanistan, specifically where it regards how to handle Hamid Karzai. An excerpt of the more compelling aspects of the story (the last half, dealing with military brass in the place of dinner with Joe Biden) appears below ...
(By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, May 11, 2010)
Tensions in the administration's relationship with Karzai began a year ago, when U.S. officials sought to find a viable candidate to challenge him in presidential elections held in August. Karzai eventually won another five-year term amid widespread allegations of fraud. Although the administration pledged a renewed partnership, sharp exchanges over the last several months have tested both sides.
Although recognizing the need to maintain good relations with Karzai, the administration hopes to dilute his authority and enhance regional stability in Afghanistan by strengthening government at the district and local levels. Strong local governance is viewed as crucial to the success of an upcoming offensive in the southern city of Kandahar -- a Taliban stronghold -- that U.S. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal said Monday would be "decisive" in the overall Afghanistan war effort.
Karzai's visit also comes amid reports of dissension between McChrystal, the overall commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, and Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, a retired three-star general who once had McChrystal's job. As Obama was formulating his new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy late last summer, Eikenberry sent a pair of diplomatic cables to Washington questioning Karzai's competence and whether any strategy could succeed as long as he was president.
Asked at a White House media briefing Monday whether his concerns had been allayed, Eikenberry said that "Karzai is the elected president of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a close friend and ally, and of course I highly respect President Karzai in that capacity."
McChrystal, who also spoke at the briefing, tried to head off questions about reports of personal and policy disagreements between him and Eikenberry, opening his remarks by saying: "It's good to be here today with my colleague and friend Karl Eikenberry."
Eikenberry returned the favor, beginning his statement by complimenting the remarks of "my friend and partner in Afghanistan over many years, General Stan McChrystal."
The two have disagreed, among other things, on whether to address Afghanistan's energy and agricultural problems with quick-fix solutions proposed by the military or more sustainable projects, favored by Eikenberry, that take longer to show results. In a report released Monday, the Center for American Progress, generally supportive of the administration, charged that "officials are paying too little attention to the sustainability of the programs and the Afghan state we are achieving."
The center, staffed by many former Obama campaign advisers, said that the Karzai government "operates on a highly centralized patronage model in which power and resources are channeled through Hamid Karzai's personal and political allies" in a system that "invites corruption, rent-seeking, and a hemorrhaging of domestic legitimacy."
A Washington Post story delves into some of the rifts in the high ranks of the military over strategies and policies in Afghanistan, specifically where it regards how to handle Hamid Karzai. An excerpt of the more compelling aspects of the story (the last half, dealing with military brass in the place of dinner with Joe Biden) appears below ...
(By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, May 11, 2010)
Tensions in the administration's relationship with Karzai began a year ago, when U.S. officials sought to find a viable candidate to challenge him in presidential elections held in August. Karzai eventually won another five-year term amid widespread allegations of fraud. Although the administration pledged a renewed partnership, sharp exchanges over the last several months have tested both sides.
Although recognizing the need to maintain good relations with Karzai, the administration hopes to dilute his authority and enhance regional stability in Afghanistan by strengthening government at the district and local levels. Strong local governance is viewed as crucial to the success of an upcoming offensive in the southern city of Kandahar -- a Taliban stronghold -- that U.S. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal said Monday would be "decisive" in the overall Afghanistan war effort.
Karzai's visit also comes amid reports of dissension between McChrystal, the overall commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, and Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, a retired three-star general who once had McChrystal's job. As Obama was formulating his new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy late last summer, Eikenberry sent a pair of diplomatic cables to Washington questioning Karzai's competence and whether any strategy could succeed as long as he was president.
Asked at a White House media briefing Monday whether his concerns had been allayed, Eikenberry said that "Karzai is the elected president of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a close friend and ally, and of course I highly respect President Karzai in that capacity."
McChrystal, who also spoke at the briefing, tried to head off questions about reports of personal and policy disagreements between him and Eikenberry, opening his remarks by saying: "It's good to be here today with my colleague and friend Karl Eikenberry."
Eikenberry returned the favor, beginning his statement by complimenting the remarks of "my friend and partner in Afghanistan over many years, General Stan McChrystal."
The two have disagreed, among other things, on whether to address Afghanistan's energy and agricultural problems with quick-fix solutions proposed by the military or more sustainable projects, favored by Eikenberry, that take longer to show results. In a report released Monday, the Center for American Progress, generally supportive of the administration, charged that "officials are paying too little attention to the sustainability of the programs and the Afghan state we are achieving."
The center, staffed by many former Obama campaign advisers, said that the Karzai government "operates on a highly centralized patronage model in which power and resources are channeled through Hamid Karzai's personal and political allies" in a system that "invites corruption, rent-seeking, and a hemorrhaging of domestic legitimacy."
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