Excerpt from Jeremy Scahill's May 4 Nation magazine online story ...
A US Special Operations Force source told me that the planes were likely RC-12s equipped with a Guardrail Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) system that, as the plane flies overland "sucks up" digital and electronic communications. "Think of them as manned drones. They're drones, but they have men sitting in them piloting them and they can be networked together," said the source. "You have many of them--four, five, six of them--and they all act as a node and they scrape up everything, anything that's electronic and feed it back." The source added: "It sucks up everything. We've got these things in Jalalabad [Afghanistan]. We routinely fly these things over Khandahar. When I say everything, I mean BlueTooth would be effected, even the wave length that PlayStation controllers are on. They suck up everything. That's the point."
Guardrail has been used for years by the US military. In recent years, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military has also used the "Constant Hawk" and "Highlighter" aerial sensor platforms. All of these programs have recently undergone a series of upgrades.
So were US special forces involved with Shahzad's arrest?
"My conjecture at the moment is that immediately after this went down and they knew that he was on the loose, parts of the domestic counter-terrorism operations that they had set up during the Bush administration were reactivated," says the Special Forces source. "They're compartmentalized. So they kicked into high gear and were supporting law enforcement. In some cases, law enforcement may not have even known that some of the signals intelligence was coming from covert military units."
Showing posts with label Kandahar. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kandahar. Show all posts
Friday, May 14, 2010
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
Campaign to push Taliban out of Kandahar has 7 months to succeed
May 11 article in The Australian comes via Afghan Conflict Monitor ...
THE campaign to drive the Taliban out of Kandahar province has until the end of the year to succeed if it is to capitalise on maximum troop numbers and political unity, Nato commanders and Western diplomats told The Times.
"Our mission is to show irreversible momentum by the end of 2010 - that's the clock I'm using," Brigadier-General Frederick Hodges, the US Director of Operations in southern Afghanistan, said. "We'll never have more capacity than we have by late summer 2010. We'll never have it any better."
The joint Nato-Afghan campaign - codenamed Hamkari, which is the Dari word for co-operation - will use the biggest number of troops and police in the country yet. Thousands of Afghan National Army soldiers and paramilitaries are to combine with the existing coalition force in Kandahar as well as additional units from among the 13,000 troops being sent in the second phase of the US surge.
The military strategy involves combining regular US soldiers and special forces with Afghan police and paramilitaries to establish 32 posts around Kandahar city at every access point along the key route through the province. Afghan army units and coalition troops will then attempt to clear the Taliban from the outlying districts of Arghandab, Zhari and Panjwayi.
President Karzai and Western commanders have avoided calling Hamkari an operation and have emphasised its political and administrative focus. Kandahar is the Taliban's traditional heartland and its population has become disaffected with the nepotism, ineptitude and corruption that have characterised the local government.
"I'm not going to talk about a D-day or an H-hour or even, for that matter, military operations," said Major-General Nick Carter, the British officer commanding coalition forces in the south. "This is much more about getting the population to feel secure in the hands of its own government and its own security forces so that it then begins to work... as an informing population, so that it denies the insurgent the freedom of movement to come in and intimidate and mount `spectaculars'."
The first phase of Hamkari began a fortnight ago and the strategy will include measures such as registering weapons, vehicles, hotels, madrassas and seminaries. Western officials are keen to have a broader range of village and tribal representation in the shuras, or councils, which communicate with officials. They are also keen to bolster the authority of Tooryalai Wesa, the Governor, at the expense of the city's current strongman, Ahmad Wali Karzai, the half-brother of the President.
Nato commanders estimate that up to 75 per cent of Taliban fighters in Kandahar province, most of whom are concentrated in the three districts targeted by the military campaign, are locals who may reintegrate if they are offered the right incentives. The commanders are also encouraged by the absence of foreign fighters. "We've seen no hardcore al-Qa'ida links here," a senior Nato intelligence officer told The Times. "Zero al-Qa'ida."
Yet Nato officers know that they have a tough deadline. By the end of the year troop numbers will decline and Dutch forces will withdraw. In November political attention in Washington will be focused on the midterm elections and critics of the war will remind President Obama of his pledge to start pulling out combat troops in 2011.
"If there's a change in the game and it looks like we can run the table then Obama will gain some political oxygen," noted a senior Western diplomat involved closely with the Hamkari campaign. "But if we can't deliver by Christmas... people at home will remind the President of the deal (to begin the withdrawal of US combat troops in 2011)."
Apart from the need for evidence of success, Nato planners have several other concerns. Officers note that it took the Afghan Government too long to put ministry level representatives in two districts of Helmand that were cleared of the Taliban during Operation Moshtarak this year, and question how it will fare in Kandahar, which is four times the size.
Although the Western officials are keen for the Taliban fighters to reintegrate, as yet there is no plan from the Government to encourage this. "There has to be a carrot at the end of the stick if these fighters are to reintegrate," one officer said, "but as yet we don't see one from Kabul."
THE campaign to drive the Taliban out of Kandahar province has until the end of the year to succeed if it is to capitalise on maximum troop numbers and political unity, Nato commanders and Western diplomats told The Times.
"Our mission is to show irreversible momentum by the end of 2010 - that's the clock I'm using," Brigadier-General Frederick Hodges, the US Director of Operations in southern Afghanistan, said. "We'll never have more capacity than we have by late summer 2010. We'll never have it any better."
The joint Nato-Afghan campaign - codenamed Hamkari, which is the Dari word for co-operation - will use the biggest number of troops and police in the country yet. Thousands of Afghan National Army soldiers and paramilitaries are to combine with the existing coalition force in Kandahar as well as additional units from among the 13,000 troops being sent in the second phase of the US surge.
The military strategy involves combining regular US soldiers and special forces with Afghan police and paramilitaries to establish 32 posts around Kandahar city at every access point along the key route through the province. Afghan army units and coalition troops will then attempt to clear the Taliban from the outlying districts of Arghandab, Zhari and Panjwayi.
President Karzai and Western commanders have avoided calling Hamkari an operation and have emphasised its political and administrative focus. Kandahar is the Taliban's traditional heartland and its population has become disaffected with the nepotism, ineptitude and corruption that have characterised the local government.
"I'm not going to talk about a D-day or an H-hour or even, for that matter, military operations," said Major-General Nick Carter, the British officer commanding coalition forces in the south. "This is much more about getting the population to feel secure in the hands of its own government and its own security forces so that it then begins to work... as an informing population, so that it denies the insurgent the freedom of movement to come in and intimidate and mount `spectaculars'."
The first phase of Hamkari began a fortnight ago and the strategy will include measures such as registering weapons, vehicles, hotels, madrassas and seminaries. Western officials are keen to have a broader range of village and tribal representation in the shuras, or councils, which communicate with officials. They are also keen to bolster the authority of Tooryalai Wesa, the Governor, at the expense of the city's current strongman, Ahmad Wali Karzai, the half-brother of the President.
Nato commanders estimate that up to 75 per cent of Taliban fighters in Kandahar province, most of whom are concentrated in the three districts targeted by the military campaign, are locals who may reintegrate if they are offered the right incentives. The commanders are also encouraged by the absence of foreign fighters. "We've seen no hardcore al-Qa'ida links here," a senior Nato intelligence officer told The Times. "Zero al-Qa'ida."
Yet Nato officers know that they have a tough deadline. By the end of the year troop numbers will decline and Dutch forces will withdraw. In November political attention in Washington will be focused on the midterm elections and critics of the war will remind President Obama of his pledge to start pulling out combat troops in 2011.
"If there's a change in the game and it looks like we can run the table then Obama will gain some political oxygen," noted a senior Western diplomat involved closely with the Hamkari campaign. "But if we can't deliver by Christmas... people at home will remind the President of the deal (to begin the withdrawal of US combat troops in 2011)."
Apart from the need for evidence of success, Nato planners have several other concerns. Officers note that it took the Afghan Government too long to put ministry level representatives in two districts of Helmand that were cleared of the Taliban during Operation Moshtarak this year, and question how it will fare in Kandahar, which is four times the size.
Although the Western officials are keen for the Taliban fighters to reintegrate, as yet there is no plan from the Government to encourage this. "There has to be a carrot at the end of the stick if these fighters are to reintegrate," one officer said, "but as yet we don't see one from Kabul."
Tuesday, May 11, 2010
Karzai visit: beneath the veneer of glad-handing
"Afghanistan's Karzai arrives in Washington for visit intended to ease tensions"
A Washington Post story delves into some of the rifts in the high ranks of the military over strategies and policies in Afghanistan, specifically where it regards how to handle Hamid Karzai. An excerpt of the more compelling aspects of the story (the last half, dealing with military brass in the place of dinner with Joe Biden) appears below ...
(By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, May 11, 2010)
Tensions in the administration's relationship with Karzai began a year ago, when U.S. officials sought to find a viable candidate to challenge him in presidential elections held in August. Karzai eventually won another five-year term amid widespread allegations of fraud. Although the administration pledged a renewed partnership, sharp exchanges over the last several months have tested both sides.
Although recognizing the need to maintain good relations with Karzai, the administration hopes to dilute his authority and enhance regional stability in Afghanistan by strengthening government at the district and local levels. Strong local governance is viewed as crucial to the success of an upcoming offensive in the southern city of Kandahar -- a Taliban stronghold -- that U.S. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal said Monday would be "decisive" in the overall Afghanistan war effort.
Karzai's visit also comes amid reports of dissension between McChrystal, the overall commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, and Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, a retired three-star general who once had McChrystal's job. As Obama was formulating his new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy late last summer, Eikenberry sent a pair of diplomatic cables to Washington questioning Karzai's competence and whether any strategy could succeed as long as he was president.
Asked at a White House media briefing Monday whether his concerns had been allayed, Eikenberry said that "Karzai is the elected president of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a close friend and ally, and of course I highly respect President Karzai in that capacity."
McChrystal, who also spoke at the briefing, tried to head off questions about reports of personal and policy disagreements between him and Eikenberry, opening his remarks by saying: "It's good to be here today with my colleague and friend Karl Eikenberry."
Eikenberry returned the favor, beginning his statement by complimenting the remarks of "my friend and partner in Afghanistan over many years, General Stan McChrystal."
The two have disagreed, among other things, on whether to address Afghanistan's energy and agricultural problems with quick-fix solutions proposed by the military or more sustainable projects, favored by Eikenberry, that take longer to show results. In a report released Monday, the Center for American Progress, generally supportive of the administration, charged that "officials are paying too little attention to the sustainability of the programs and the Afghan state we are achieving."
The center, staffed by many former Obama campaign advisers, said that the Karzai government "operates on a highly centralized patronage model in which power and resources are channeled through Hamid Karzai's personal and political allies" in a system that "invites corruption, rent-seeking, and a hemorrhaging of domestic legitimacy."
A Washington Post story delves into some of the rifts in the high ranks of the military over strategies and policies in Afghanistan, specifically where it regards how to handle Hamid Karzai. An excerpt of the more compelling aspects of the story (the last half, dealing with military brass in the place of dinner with Joe Biden) appears below ...
(By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, May 11, 2010)
Tensions in the administration's relationship with Karzai began a year ago, when U.S. officials sought to find a viable candidate to challenge him in presidential elections held in August. Karzai eventually won another five-year term amid widespread allegations of fraud. Although the administration pledged a renewed partnership, sharp exchanges over the last several months have tested both sides.
Although recognizing the need to maintain good relations with Karzai, the administration hopes to dilute his authority and enhance regional stability in Afghanistan by strengthening government at the district and local levels. Strong local governance is viewed as crucial to the success of an upcoming offensive in the southern city of Kandahar -- a Taliban stronghold -- that U.S. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal said Monday would be "decisive" in the overall Afghanistan war effort.
Karzai's visit also comes amid reports of dissension between McChrystal, the overall commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, and Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, a retired three-star general who once had McChrystal's job. As Obama was formulating his new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy late last summer, Eikenberry sent a pair of diplomatic cables to Washington questioning Karzai's competence and whether any strategy could succeed as long as he was president.
Asked at a White House media briefing Monday whether his concerns had been allayed, Eikenberry said that "Karzai is the elected president of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a close friend and ally, and of course I highly respect President Karzai in that capacity."
McChrystal, who also spoke at the briefing, tried to head off questions about reports of personal and policy disagreements between him and Eikenberry, opening his remarks by saying: "It's good to be here today with my colleague and friend Karl Eikenberry."
Eikenberry returned the favor, beginning his statement by complimenting the remarks of "my friend and partner in Afghanistan over many years, General Stan McChrystal."
The two have disagreed, among other things, on whether to address Afghanistan's energy and agricultural problems with quick-fix solutions proposed by the military or more sustainable projects, favored by Eikenberry, that take longer to show results. In a report released Monday, the Center for American Progress, generally supportive of the administration, charged that "officials are paying too little attention to the sustainability of the programs and the Afghan state we are achieving."
The center, staffed by many former Obama campaign advisers, said that the Karzai government "operates on a highly centralized patronage model in which power and resources are channeled through Hamid Karzai's personal and political allies" in a system that "invites corruption, rent-seeking, and a hemorrhaging of domestic legitimacy."
Monday, May 10, 2010
Pentagon report on Afghanistan 4/26
From Stars and Stripes
By Jeff Schogol
Stars and Stripes online edition, Wednesday, April 28, 2010
• Read the report (FULL TEXT AVAILABLE; see above link) (PDF, 4MB)
[excerpt]
ARLINGTON, Va. — Despite the addition of more than 50,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan over the past year, there still aren’t enough forces to conduct operations in the majority of key areas, according to a congressionally mandated report released Wednesday on progress in Afghanistan.
Coalition forces have decided to focus their efforts on 121 key districts in Afghanistan, but right now, NATO has enough forces to operate in only 48 of those districts, the report said.
There are currently 86,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, up from about 30,000 when President Barack Obama took office. By August, there will be 98,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
With the rest of the U.S. and foreign partner troops that will arrive in Afghanistan this year, coalition and Afghan security forces will be able to focus on all 121 districts "over coming months," a senior Defense official said Wednesday, declining to be more specific.
Also, from Inter Press Service (IPS)
Pentagon Doubts Grow on McChrystal War Plan
Analysis by Gareth Porter*
[excerpt]
WASHINGTON, May 10, 2010 (IPS) - Although Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's plan for wresting the Afghan provinces of Helmand and Kandahar from the Taliban is still in its early stages of implementation, there are already signs that setbacks and obstacles it has encountered have raised serious doubts among top military officials in Washington about whether the plan is going to work.
Scepticism about McChrystal's ambitious aims was implicit in the way the Pentagon report on the war issued Apr. 26 assessed the progress of the campaign in Marja. Now, as Afghan President Hamid Karzai begins a four-day round of consultations with President Barack Obama and other senior U.S. officials here this week, the new report has been given even more pointed expression by an unnamed "senior military official" quoted in a column in the Washington Post Sunday by David Ignatius.
The senior military officer criticised McChrystal's announcement in February that he had "a government in a box, ready to roll in" for the Marja campaign, for having created "an expectation of rapidity and efficiency that doesn't exist now", according to Ignatius.
The same military official is also quoted as pointing out that parts of Helmand that were supposed to have been cleared by the offensive in February and March are in fact still under Taliban control and that Afghan government performance in the wake of the offensive had been disappointing, according to Ignatius.
The outlook at the Pentagon and the White House on the nascent Kandahar offensive is also pessimistic, judging from the comment to Ignatius by an unnamed "senior administration official". The official told Ignatius the operation is "still a work in progress", observing that McChrystal's command was still trying to decide how much of the local government the military could "salvage" and how much "you have to rebuild".
By Jeff Schogol
Stars and Stripes online edition, Wednesday, April 28, 2010
• Read the report (FULL TEXT AVAILABLE; see above link) (PDF, 4MB)
[excerpt]
ARLINGTON, Va. — Despite the addition of more than 50,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan over the past year, there still aren’t enough forces to conduct operations in the majority of key areas, according to a congressionally mandated report released Wednesday on progress in Afghanistan.
Coalition forces have decided to focus their efforts on 121 key districts in Afghanistan, but right now, NATO has enough forces to operate in only 48 of those districts, the report said.
There are currently 86,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, up from about 30,000 when President Barack Obama took office. By August, there will be 98,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
With the rest of the U.S. and foreign partner troops that will arrive in Afghanistan this year, coalition and Afghan security forces will be able to focus on all 121 districts "over coming months," a senior Defense official said Wednesday, declining to be more specific.
Also, from Inter Press Service (IPS)
Pentagon Doubts Grow on McChrystal War Plan
Analysis by Gareth Porter*
[excerpt]
WASHINGTON, May 10, 2010 (IPS) - Although Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's plan for wresting the Afghan provinces of Helmand and Kandahar from the Taliban is still in its early stages of implementation, there are already signs that setbacks and obstacles it has encountered have raised serious doubts among top military officials in Washington about whether the plan is going to work.
Scepticism about McChrystal's ambitious aims was implicit in the way the Pentagon report on the war issued Apr. 26 assessed the progress of the campaign in Marja. Now, as Afghan President Hamid Karzai begins a four-day round of consultations with President Barack Obama and other senior U.S. officials here this week, the new report has been given even more pointed expression by an unnamed "senior military official" quoted in a column in the Washington Post Sunday by David Ignatius.
The senior military officer criticised McChrystal's announcement in February that he had "a government in a box, ready to roll in" for the Marja campaign, for having created "an expectation of rapidity and efficiency that doesn't exist now", according to Ignatius.
The same military official is also quoted as pointing out that parts of Helmand that were supposed to have been cleared by the offensive in February and March are in fact still under Taliban control and that Afghan government performance in the wake of the offensive had been disappointing, according to Ignatius.
The outlook at the Pentagon and the White House on the nascent Kandahar offensive is also pessimistic, judging from the comment to Ignatius by an unnamed "senior administration official". The official told Ignatius the operation is "still a work in progress", observing that McChrystal's command was still trying to decide how much of the local government the military could "salvage" and how much "you have to rebuild".
Friday, April 30, 2010
Summer in what's left of Afghanistan: Operation Omid
Here's an article I missed April 19 (Possibly, "I Missed It." is a new section in the works at Extraordinary Edition) that RadioactiveGavin was keen to collect.
By Jean MacKenzie for GlobalPost
Published: April 19, 2010 07:16 ET
KABUL, Afghanistan — It is being called Operation Omid.
The word omid means "hope" in Afghanistan’s Dari language. But, judging by the reaction of local residents, the coming U.S.-led military offensive against the Taliban in Kandahar could not be more inappropriately named.
In Kandahar, residents like Abdul Salaam, a farmer, feel more a sense of dread than hope about a military operation that is being billed as one of the largest in the war to date.
“Operation Omid will bring more insecurity, instead of peace,” said Salaam, who lives in the Maiwand district of Kandahar Province. “We have just seen that the opposition has accelerated its attacks. There are more and more explosions in the province. You cannot bring peace through war.”
Operation Omid will not be fully underway until early summer, according to the U.S. military. The exact size of the force to be deployed is not yet clear, but it is expected to swallow a good portion of the 30,000 additional troops being sent to Afghanistan this year.
The operation will center on two districts — Arghandab and Zheray — rather than on the city itself. Fighting in a major population center, moreover one that is home to some of Islam’s most cherished relics, such as the cloak of the Prophet, would go against the hearts and minds strategy that has been a central tenet of the new U.S. strategy.
The Taliban seem eager to get things started.
Over the past week, a series of suicide explosions have rocked the city center. This, along with the much-publicized shooting of a civilian bus by U.S. troops, has given Kandaharis a taste of the approaching conflict. They do not seem to relish the prospect.
The U.S. military has been talking of Kandahar ever since they declared success in Marjah, a dusty patch of desert in neighboring Helmand Province. Once the Afghan flag was raised over the Marjah district center in early March, Kandahar became the focal point of the stepped-up battle against the Taliban.
The choice of target was not coincidental: Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second-largest city, is the spiritual home of the Taliban, the birthplace of the movement that took over most of the country in the mid to late ‘90s.
The city is not under Taliban control — the government, in the person of Ahmad Wali Karzai, the president’s half-brother and head of Kandahar’s Provincial Council, dominates the center. This is one reason that the fighting will be spread out to the districts surrounding the center.
Observers say that this will prompt the Taliban to adopt their usual tactics — melting away until the foreign forces retreat, then flooding back into the area.
“The armed opposition is experienced in guerrilla warfare,” said Bismillah Afghanmal, a senator from Kandahar. “They know when and where to fight, and they know very well how to flee the area that is the focus of the operation. Omid will not bring good results.”
Some of the fighters are moving into more remote districts, but a good number are heading for the city, where they appear ready to carry out regular acts of “asymmetrical warfare” — suicide bombings, the planting of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and other measures designed to spread terror.
As a result, the situation in Kandahar city is deteriorating rapidly, according to author Alex Strick van Linschoten, who has been living in the southern capital for more than two years conducting research on the Taliban.
“We are running out of ways to say how bad things are,” he said. “There is a general feeling of paranoia and fear — fear of what’s going to happen tomorrow, of what the future will bring. No one wants to be in Kandahar. Everyone is trying to sell up and get out.”
The panic was heightened over the past week week, when a double suicide bombing on April 15 killed at least 10 people and injured dozens of others. The first explosion occurred outside Noor Jehan, a hotel popular with the international press, while a second, larger blast followed it hours later, when a vehicle crammed with explosives penetrated the outer defenses of a compound housing foreign contractors.
This is having the desired effect of intimidating the local population.
“The Taliban are signaling to the foreign forces that they have the power to answer any attack,” said Abdul Salaam. “They are trying to show that they have not been weakened by the Marjah operation.”
Nevertheless, the commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has assured the Afghan people that the U.S. forces would “absolutely secure Kandahar.”
In a press conference in March, McChrystal outlined the military’s plans in broad strokes. Rather than beginning the operation with a Marjah-style bang, the Kandahar “process” will be more subtle, he indicated.
“There won’t be a D-Day that is climactic,” said McChrystal. “It will be a rising tide of security as it comes.”
But so far the tide seems to be going out.
“The Taliban are prepared for this operation,” said Felix Kuehn, who along with van Linschoten co-edited an autobiography of Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaeef, former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, who spent nearly four years in Guantanamo and now lives under virtual house arrest in Kabul.
Kuehn has also spent the better part of two years in Kandahar.
“It will be close to impossible to stop their attacks," he said. The intelligence required is simply not available. The local population does not trust the foreign forces, and knows that they will not be safe if they cooperate.”
In Marjah, the Taliban has carried out brutal retribution against residents who are seen to assist the government or the foreign forces. Residents tell of people being dragged out of their houses at night, hanged or beheaded, their bodies left as a warning to others.
In addition to ordinary Kandaharis, added Kuehn, the business community is also being asked to provide goods and services to the insurgency.
“Businessmen are being pressured to team up with the Taliban,” he said. “They are told, 'It is for your own good. You know in the end we will be in control, so it is best to be on our side now.'”
Few are willing to bet their livelihoods — and their lives — on the success of the foreign forces, said both Kuehn and van Linschoten.
Gaining the trust and support of the local population is vital for McChrystal’s much-touted counterinsurgency strategy, or COIN. But it will be an uphill battle to win the hearts and minds of Kandaharis, given the current situation.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has promised local elders that the operation will not take place without their consent.
In a shura, or council, with tribal elders in Kandahar on April 4, Karzai asked those assembled whether they wanted the operation. They assured him they did not. According to a journalist who was present at the shura, the mood of the gathering was openly hostile, and Karzai’s neighbors on the podium — McChrystal and Mark Sedwill, the Senior NATO civilian representative in Afghanistan, looked distinctly uncomfortable.
Relations between the local population and the United States worsened still further on April 12, when U.S. troops opened fire on a passenger bus near a Kandahar checkpoint, killing four and injuring 18. The incident sparked violent anti-American protests, as hundreds of demonstrators poured out onto the streets, blocking roads and shouting “Death to the infidels!”
A week later, the anger is still smoldering.
“All the people on that bus were innocent passengers,” said Haji Mohammad Daud, a resident of the Karez Bazaar area of Kandahar city. “What will the families of the victims think?”
Relatives of civilian victims often end up joining the insurgency, he added.
“The opposition uses cases like this as a propaganda tool against the government; they tell people that foreign forces are not here to help — they have come to kill you.”
The U.S. military apologized for the incident, calling it “a tragic loss of life,” but McChrystal appealed for understanding.
“We really ask a lot of our young service people out on checkpoints because there is danger, they’re asked to make very rapid decisions in often very unclear situations,” The New York Times quoted him as saying.
Several hours after the bus shooting, insurgents attacked the headquarters of Kandahar’s intelligence service. The attackers were the only ones to die, but four officials and five civilians were wounded, further raising anxieties in the city.
Against this backdrop of fear and turmoil, prospects for success are looking dim to those on the ground in Kandahar.
“The foreign forces will never have the knowledge and control they need to secure the city,” said van Linschoten. “The Taliban are already there, and can do whatever they want. Short of erecting barbed wire barriers and total ID check, like Baghdad in Year Zero, they cannot do anything. It is a recipe for disaster.”
Ahmad Nadeem, a freelance journalist from Kandahar, contributed to this report from Kandahar.
By Jean MacKenzie for GlobalPost
Published: April 19, 2010 07:16 ET
KABUL, Afghanistan — It is being called Operation Omid.
The word omid means "hope" in Afghanistan’s Dari language. But, judging by the reaction of local residents, the coming U.S.-led military offensive against the Taliban in Kandahar could not be more inappropriately named.
In Kandahar, residents like Abdul Salaam, a farmer, feel more a sense of dread than hope about a military operation that is being billed as one of the largest in the war to date.
“Operation Omid will bring more insecurity, instead of peace,” said Salaam, who lives in the Maiwand district of Kandahar Province. “We have just seen that the opposition has accelerated its attacks. There are more and more explosions in the province. You cannot bring peace through war.”
Operation Omid will not be fully underway until early summer, according to the U.S. military. The exact size of the force to be deployed is not yet clear, but it is expected to swallow a good portion of the 30,000 additional troops being sent to Afghanistan this year.
The operation will center on two districts — Arghandab and Zheray — rather than on the city itself. Fighting in a major population center, moreover one that is home to some of Islam’s most cherished relics, such as the cloak of the Prophet, would go against the hearts and minds strategy that has been a central tenet of the new U.S. strategy.
The Taliban seem eager to get things started.
Over the past week, a series of suicide explosions have rocked the city center. This, along with the much-publicized shooting of a civilian bus by U.S. troops, has given Kandaharis a taste of the approaching conflict. They do not seem to relish the prospect.
The U.S. military has been talking of Kandahar ever since they declared success in Marjah, a dusty patch of desert in neighboring Helmand Province. Once the Afghan flag was raised over the Marjah district center in early March, Kandahar became the focal point of the stepped-up battle against the Taliban.
The choice of target was not coincidental: Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second-largest city, is the spiritual home of the Taliban, the birthplace of the movement that took over most of the country in the mid to late ‘90s.
The city is not under Taliban control — the government, in the person of Ahmad Wali Karzai, the president’s half-brother and head of Kandahar’s Provincial Council, dominates the center. This is one reason that the fighting will be spread out to the districts surrounding the center.
Observers say that this will prompt the Taliban to adopt their usual tactics — melting away until the foreign forces retreat, then flooding back into the area.
“The armed opposition is experienced in guerrilla warfare,” said Bismillah Afghanmal, a senator from Kandahar. “They know when and where to fight, and they know very well how to flee the area that is the focus of the operation. Omid will not bring good results.”
Some of the fighters are moving into more remote districts, but a good number are heading for the city, where they appear ready to carry out regular acts of “asymmetrical warfare” — suicide bombings, the planting of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and other measures designed to spread terror.
As a result, the situation in Kandahar city is deteriorating rapidly, according to author Alex Strick van Linschoten, who has been living in the southern capital for more than two years conducting research on the Taliban.
“We are running out of ways to say how bad things are,” he said. “There is a general feeling of paranoia and fear — fear of what’s going to happen tomorrow, of what the future will bring. No one wants to be in Kandahar. Everyone is trying to sell up and get out.”
The panic was heightened over the past week week, when a double suicide bombing on April 15 killed at least 10 people and injured dozens of others. The first explosion occurred outside Noor Jehan, a hotel popular with the international press, while a second, larger blast followed it hours later, when a vehicle crammed with explosives penetrated the outer defenses of a compound housing foreign contractors.
This is having the desired effect of intimidating the local population.
“The Taliban are signaling to the foreign forces that they have the power to answer any attack,” said Abdul Salaam. “They are trying to show that they have not been weakened by the Marjah operation.”
Nevertheless, the commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has assured the Afghan people that the U.S. forces would “absolutely secure Kandahar.”
In a press conference in March, McChrystal outlined the military’s plans in broad strokes. Rather than beginning the operation with a Marjah-style bang, the Kandahar “process” will be more subtle, he indicated.
“There won’t be a D-Day that is climactic,” said McChrystal. “It will be a rising tide of security as it comes.”
But so far the tide seems to be going out.
“The Taliban are prepared for this operation,” said Felix Kuehn, who along with van Linschoten co-edited an autobiography of Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaeef, former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, who spent nearly four years in Guantanamo and now lives under virtual house arrest in Kabul.
Kuehn has also spent the better part of two years in Kandahar.
“It will be close to impossible to stop their attacks," he said. The intelligence required is simply not available. The local population does not trust the foreign forces, and knows that they will not be safe if they cooperate.”
In Marjah, the Taliban has carried out brutal retribution against residents who are seen to assist the government or the foreign forces. Residents tell of people being dragged out of their houses at night, hanged or beheaded, their bodies left as a warning to others.
In addition to ordinary Kandaharis, added Kuehn, the business community is also being asked to provide goods and services to the insurgency.
“Businessmen are being pressured to team up with the Taliban,” he said. “They are told, 'It is for your own good. You know in the end we will be in control, so it is best to be on our side now.'”
Few are willing to bet their livelihoods — and their lives — on the success of the foreign forces, said both Kuehn and van Linschoten.
Gaining the trust and support of the local population is vital for McChrystal’s much-touted counterinsurgency strategy, or COIN. But it will be an uphill battle to win the hearts and minds of Kandaharis, given the current situation.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has promised local elders that the operation will not take place without their consent.
In a shura, or council, with tribal elders in Kandahar on April 4, Karzai asked those assembled whether they wanted the operation. They assured him they did not. According to a journalist who was present at the shura, the mood of the gathering was openly hostile, and Karzai’s neighbors on the podium — McChrystal and Mark Sedwill, the Senior NATO civilian representative in Afghanistan, looked distinctly uncomfortable.
Relations between the local population and the United States worsened still further on April 12, when U.S. troops opened fire on a passenger bus near a Kandahar checkpoint, killing four and injuring 18. The incident sparked violent anti-American protests, as hundreds of demonstrators poured out onto the streets, blocking roads and shouting “Death to the infidels!”
A week later, the anger is still smoldering.
“All the people on that bus were innocent passengers,” said Haji Mohammad Daud, a resident of the Karez Bazaar area of Kandahar city. “What will the families of the victims think?”
Relatives of civilian victims often end up joining the insurgency, he added.
“The opposition uses cases like this as a propaganda tool against the government; they tell people that foreign forces are not here to help — they have come to kill you.”
The U.S. military apologized for the incident, calling it “a tragic loss of life,” but McChrystal appealed for understanding.
“We really ask a lot of our young service people out on checkpoints because there is danger, they’re asked to make very rapid decisions in often very unclear situations,” The New York Times quoted him as saying.
Several hours after the bus shooting, insurgents attacked the headquarters of Kandahar’s intelligence service. The attackers were the only ones to die, but four officials and five civilians were wounded, further raising anxieties in the city.
Against this backdrop of fear and turmoil, prospects for success are looking dim to those on the ground in Kandahar.
“The foreign forces will never have the knowledge and control they need to secure the city,” said van Linschoten. “The Taliban are already there, and can do whatever they want. Short of erecting barbed wire barriers and total ID check, like Baghdad in Year Zero, they cannot do anything. It is a recipe for disaster.”
Ahmad Nadeem, a freelance journalist from Kandahar, contributed to this report from Kandahar.
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